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Duncan Beveridge*

Regulation of the Medical
Profession in Nova Scotia

I. Introduction
Consumerism has experienced fantastic growth over the last decade
and as a result its influence is felt in almost every decision making
process. Consumer groups have operated as potent pressure groups
and have encouraged the reform of laws to protect the "little
man".' Federal and provincial legislative bodies have reacted and
attempted to protect the consuming public from unfair or
unconscionable business practices and established agencies to do
2
research and co-ordinate consumer concerns.
Until recently, consumers have fixed their attention on business
and have largely ignored services, 3 particularly those provided by
self-governing professions such as the medical profession.
The historical reasons for allowing self-government are complex.
Basically it was (and is) thought that the public interest would best
be served if professions governed themselves. 4 To this end, the state
has delegated authority to the professions.
The authority for the protection of the public has tended to have
two main features:
1) setting of educational standards before admittance to the
profession, ensuring technical competence; and
2) removal or discipline of members unfit to practice, ensuring
integrity, high ethical standards and quality.
In other words, licensing and the power to withdraw the license. 5
Little quarrel can be had with regard to the medical profession's
success in maintaining high educational standards but the general
*Duncan Beveridge, LL.B. Dalhousie, 1978.
This comment was originally prepared as a paper for a course in Consumer Law at
Dalhousie Law School.
1. See for example Consumer Products WarrantiesAct, S.S. 1977, c. 15; Trade
Practices Act, S.B.C. 1974, c. 46, as am. by S.B.C. 1975, c. 80, 1976, c. 80;
Small Loans Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. S-1; the proposed Can. Borrowers and
DepositorsProtectionBill, c. 16

2. Consumer Services Act, R.S.N.S. 1967, c.5 as am. by S.N.S. 1973, c.5
3. Except Trade PracticesAct, supra, note 1, which does include services.

4. Because of the specialized knowledge and skill involved only other members of
the profession could sit in judgment.
5. See for example, E. MacNab, A Legal History of Health Professions in Ontario

(Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1970) at 1-3. This was a Study prepared for the
Committee on the Healing Arts.
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acceptance that the public purse should pay for health services, and
the growth of consumerism, and the escalating cost of those health
services 6 has caused concern over the controls that exist to protect
the public interest, thus leading to numerous reports and
commissions.

7

The focus of this comment will be on this area with emphasis on
the medical profession's role in assuring quality.
II. Regulation in Nova Scotia
As mentioned, the privilege of self government was granted to serve
the public interest, yet the professional body has conflicting
interests in promoting and protecting the socio-economic and
professional interests of its members. 8 The Castonguay Report9
recognized the incompatibility of the two roles and recommended
the roles be clearly separated.
In Nova Scotia the Medical Society of Nova Scotia has since
earliest times' 0 been separated from the licensing authority in Nova
Scotia. 11
Today the Provincial Medical Board has the responsibility of
maintaining a system of registers containing a list of practitioners
that have met or complied with the rules and regulations made by
13
the Board. 12 To be entitled to be entered in the Medical Register
the applicant must pay the prescribed fee, be of the age of majority
and satisfy the Board that he has graduated from an approved
school; and produce satisfactory evidence of identity, experience,
6. J. McLeod, Health Security for British Columbians, B.C. Special Report on
Consumer Participation, Regulation of the Professions and Decentralization
(1974) at 2
7. See for example, J. W. Grove, Organized Medicine in Ontario - A Study for
the Committee on Healing Arts (Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1970); Ont. Report of
the Royal Commission Inquiry into Civil Rights, vol. III, "Self Governing

Professions and Occupations," (Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1968); Que. Report of
the Commission on Inquiry on Health and Social Welfare, Part V, Vol. III, "The

Professions and Society,"
Castonguay Report

(Quebec:

Quebec Official Publisher,

1970)

-

8. Que. Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Health and Social Welfare, id. at
17
9. Id. at 18

10. Medical Society of Nova Scotia Act, S.N.S. 1861, c. 69 as am. by S.N.S.
1970, c. 140
I1. See for example, R.S.N.S. 1858, c.57 or R.S.N.S. 1964, c.56

12. Medical Act, S.N.S. 1969, c.15 as am.by S.N.S. 1973, c.66
13. s.14 of the Medical Act also provides for a Temporary Medical Register for
certain classes of practitioners, which need not be mentioned here.
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good professional conduct, and good character as a citizen.
Section 40 (1) (a) of the Medical Act prohibits the practice of
medicine unless the physician is registered under the Act. Section
41 provides that on violation of s.40 every person is liable to a
penalty not exceeding $500.00 for a first offence and a penalty of
$500.00 and imprisonment for not less than seven days for a second
and subsequent offence. Thus, a monopoly is granted to physicians
licensed under the Act. Because it is a monopoly, there must be
safeguards for the public interest.
Although there is a separation between the Medical Society and
the Board, all members of the Board must be a member of the
Medical Society. Section 2 (1) of the Medical Act provides:
There shall be a Provincial Medical Board consisting of
fourteen qualified medical practitioners, each of whom has been
fully registered with the Provincial Medical Board and in good
standing for at least seven years and is a member of the Society.
Section 2 (2) of the Act further provides:
Seven members of the Board shall be appointed by Governor
in Council, six members shall be elected by the Society, and one
member shall be appointed by Dalhousie University from the
Faculty of Medicine.
So, even though the Governor in Council appoints half of the
members (for variable terms), all must be qualified medical
practitioners and members of the Medical Society of Nova Scotia.
This can lead to conflict because of the comprehensive definition of
practicing medicine contained in s.40(2):
In this section "practice medicine" includes:
(a) to allege by advertisement, sign or statement of any kind of
ability or willingness to diagnose or treat any human disease,
defect, deformity or injury;
(b) to advertise or claim ability or willingness to prescribe or
administer any drug, medicine or treatment, or to perform any
operation or manipulation, or to apply any apparatus or appliance
for the cure
or treatment of any human disease, defect, deformity
14
or injury.
Through this comprehensive definition the Board, comprised
entirely of physicians, could restrict developments that may
compete with their notions about treatment of disease. In fact this
has already happened with regard to acupuncture. The Board on
February 21, 1976 made it an official policy that acupuncture be
14. Subject to certain exceptions, e.g. dentists.

Regulation of the Medical Profession in Nova Scotia 521

deemed to be a medical procedure and/or treatment modality within
the above definition. 15
Thus the scope of initial regulation is extremely wide and could
involve subjugation of the public interest by unduly restricting entry
to the profession. Further possibilities for conflict arise when the
Board exercises its function of ensuring the fitness to practice of
licensed physicians. First it is convenient to discuss the existing
external controls over quality.
III. Mechanisms of Quality Control
A. Litigation.
Actions against physicians for negligence have not yet reached the
epidemic proportions of the United States. However, they have
increased. 16 Some have expressed fear of the negative effect of
malpractice suits 17 attendant with the consequences of practicing
"defensive medicine" which increases costs and restricts innovations. This may be true in the United States but the available
evidence shows the negligence action in Canada has a positive role
to play besides compensating victims of medical negligence.
Kretzman identifies its role in asserting social control over the
medical profession' 8 which can lead to revealing questionable
practices not of just a few practitioners but those accepted by the
profession as a whole. 19 The most blatant example of this being that
20
of Anderson v. Chasney.
A sponge had been left in the child's nose during an operation and
the child died as a result. Even though it was an accepted practice
not to carry out sponge counts in such operations, the action was
successful and the profession changed its "accepted practice".
A more recent example is the case of an anaesthetist using a
machine which had the valves reversed from the kind he was
accustomed to. During the operation he adjusted the flow of nitrous
oxide and oxygen without looking at the control valves. Due to the
reversal of controls, the patient suffered a cardiac arrest and
15. Report of the Provincial Medical Board of Nova Scotia (1975) at 26
16. Seventy-Sixth Annual Report of The Canadian Medical Protective Association
(June 1977) at 24
17. D. Kretzman, The Malpractice Suit: Is it needed? (1973), 11 Osgoode Hall
L.J. 55 at 62

18. Id. at 87
19. Id. at67
20. [195014 D.L.R. 223 (S.C.C.) aff'g [1949] 4 D.L.R. 71 (Man. C.A.)
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permanent brain damage resulted. The report of the Canadian
Medical Protective Association, from which the incident is taken,
also reported that as a result standardization of all gas machines was
21
being carried out.
It would be safe to conclude that litigation has a role to play in
improving the quality of care available to consumers. 22 Particularly
since in contrast to other areas of consumer problems the damages
actually caused are large enough to warrant legal action. Controls
such as these are important because although consumer legislation is
23
designed to protect the consumer from unfair business practices
and hazardous substances, 2 4 none of these directly stipulates a
minimum quality. Rather, quality is left to be regulated by the
market economy. Monopolies such as the medical profession, being
an essential service, have no controls over quality of service other
than by their professional colleagues. However, even monopolies
must be paid and this is the next area of control or potential quality
control.
B. Health Services and Insurance Commission
It is not within the scope or purpose of this paper to examine the
complex arrangement of financing provided by the Health Services
and Insurance Act. 2 5 However, basically the Commission pays for
27
hospital costs 26 and fees claimed by the physician.
This is one time when the old adage of "he who pays the piper
also calls the tune" does not hold true. Largely, no real quality
control exists although s. 12 of the Health Services and Insurance
Act 2 8 provides for regulations which are broad enough to allow the
imposition of controls governing medical care in the hospital and
the physician's office.
C. The Role of the Hospital
As primary medical care moves from the office setting to
21. Supra, note 16 at 17-18
22. See for example, M.I. Roemer, Controllingand PromotingQuality in Medical

Care (1970), 35 Law and Contemporary Problems 284 at 297
23. Supra, note I
24. Hazardous ProductsAct, R.S.C. 1970, c. H-13; Food and Drugs Act, R.S.C.

1970, c. F-27
25. S.N.S. 1973, c.8 as am. by 1974, c. 31; 1977, c. 2

26. Id., s. 8
27. Id., s. 19
28. Id., s. 12 ( 1) and (2)
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hospitals, 29 their potential for assuming a more prominent role in
ensuring consumers receive quality care at reasonable cost 30 also
increases.
The hospital was identified by Grove to be one of the major
control factors in not only protecting against incompetence but also
quality control in the sense of aiming at ensuring the best possible
standards of care .31
In order to admit and treat patients in a hospital the physician
must be a member of the medical staff of the hospital. 3 2 The
hospital does not itself usually employ the physicians who work
there but merely grants privileges. 3 3 The hospital's Board of
Trustees has the ultimate authority and responsibility for what goes
on inside the hospital. The medical care system, however, is
actively run by the Medical Advisory Committee (MAC) and its
network of committees such as the Clinical Appraisal Committee
which has such duties as:
(a) evaluate and review the professional work of each member of
the medical staff ...
(b) cause the head of each department to evaluate the medical
care provided
by each member having privileges in the
34
department.
The department head also has the duty and responsibility for
the supervision over any matter affecting the treatment of patients
within his department and, given a serious problem, may remove
35
the physician in charge after discussing the case with him.
29. L. E. Rozovsky, The Hospital's Responsibility for Quality of Care Under
English Common Law (1976), 24 Chitty's Law Journal 132
30. Although not elaborated on, most hospitals have or should have Utilization
Committees overseeing efficient use of the hospital facilities e.g. Prototype
Hospital By-Laws (3rd draft), s. 100, published by the N.S. Association of
Hospital Organizations.
31. Grove, supra, note 7 at 175
32. See for example, Regulations of the Board of Commissioners, Victoria
General Hospital, Reg. 22
33. Granted on recommendation of the Credentials Committee through which the
Board receives and acts, e.g. id., Reg. 29. The Credentials Committee
recommends to the Executive Committee which recommends to the Board.
34. Prototype HospitalBy-Laws, s.97 (2), supra, note 30. Also see, V.G. Regs.
Reg. 30.02, supra, note 32
35. Id. Prototype s. 72 and V. G. Regs, Reg. 23.18. This active duty is also
helpful in so far as the Credentials Committee is composed of departmental heads
(Reg. 29.01, V.G. Regs.) so that even if the extreme action contemplated by Reg.
23.18 is not used, the department head will at least be aware of any deficiencies in a

physicians competence.
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The potential for effective and comprehensive quality control
certainly exists. However, some doubt has been expressed as to the
degree of confidence to be placed in the hospital's role.
The machinery is aimed at securing that, so far as possible, the
doctor in the hospital has privileges in keeping with his
competence, but in practice it is acknowledged to be far from
infallible; the supervision of quality of care by medical advisory
committees often leaves much to be desired: the effectiveness of
medical audit and tissue procedures [included in duties of the
Clinical Appraisal Committee] is conditioned by pressure of
work and staff shortages .... 36
Add to these the problems involved with the natural reluctance to
offend professional colleagues in small community hospitals and
real doubt may be felt as to the effectiveness of the hospital's role.
In the future hospitals may be forced to ensure that their channels
of quality control are functioning properly. L. E. Rozovsky presents
an interesting case that hospitals are the only existing institution that
can effectively reduce the incidents of poor medical practice.
Speaking of this favourable goal he states:
The only system3 which
exists that can conceivably accomplish
7
this is the hospital.
and,
. . . an increase in the hospital's responsibility
would benefit the
38
majority of physicians and patients.
This increased responsibility, he theorizes, may well be imposed
on the hospitals by the common law. He argues that since hospitals
have the ultimate control over physicians (that is, removal of
privileges) and liability is founded upon public expectation, and the
public expects the hospital to screen staff, then failure to have a
proper system of control or failure to use it will constitute
negligence.39

Although the arguments sound very academic, Rozovsky notes
that several states have imposed liability on these or similar bases. 40
The developments identified may very well be desirable but this
36. Grove, supra, note 7 at 201
37. Supra, note 29 at 135
38. Id.
39. Id. at 134-135
40. Id. at 134. Mitchell Co. Hosp. v. Joiner (1972), 189 SE. (2d) 412 (Ga.);
Gonzales v. Nark and Mercy Hospitals of Sacramento No. 228566 (1973), (Sup.

Ct. of Calif.)
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writer feels it likely that changes could only come about through
legislative action and not judicial reform.
IV. Regulation by the ProvincialMedicalBoard
The maintenance of a register of qualified practitioners has already
been mentioned.
Any such register, if it is not to be a fraud on the public, must
list only those having a certain standard of competence. The body
responsible for maintaining the register has therefore two duties
to discharge. First it will have to assure itself that those admitted
it will have to remove
to the register are competent. Secondly
41
those practitioners unfit to practice.
Thus, the efficacy of the procedures of the Provincial Medical
Board in securing compliance with the acceptable standards of
competence and ethics and the removal of those unfit to practice is
of vital importance to the consumer. It will be necessary to first
outline briefly the structure and mechanisms available to the Board.
Section 27 of the Medical Act, gives the power to the Board to
appoint a Discipline Committee consisting of seven members of the
Board. The Board may investigate by such means as it sees fit any
complaint received against a qualified medical practitioner (s.28).
Complaints may be initiated by:
(a) the Board
(b) the Discipline Committee
(c) the Society
(d) any official corporate body
(e) any registered medical practitioner
(f) any other person (s. 28(2))
Thus the Board has wide power to receive and investigate a
complaint. What may be complained of is not defined. Rather, the
controlling facts would appear to be the Board's jurisdiction to take
action.
The Board has several avenues of approach to a complaint
divided by subject matter.
Section 29 of the Medical Act governs complaints alleging that a
qualified medical practitioner is not using adequate skill and
knowledge in his practice. In this case the Board may require him to
undergo such an examination as they may direct and may, as a result
thereof, erase his name from the Medical Register or erasure and
41. G. Brit. Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Regulation of the Medical

Profession (London: H.M. Stationary Office, 1975) at 3 -

Merrison Report
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entry into the temporary Medical Register subject to terms or
conditions or suspend the imposition of punishment and place the
qualified medical practitioner on probation on whatever terms the
Board may prescribe.
Section 30 of the Act governs complaints alleging professional
misconduct in which case the Discipline Committee may appoint an
Inquiry Committee 4 2 to hear the complaints. The Inquiry
Committee then reports to the Discipline Committee which may
order a formal hearing (s.30c). Following an investigation the
Board shall receive the Discipline Committee's written findings and
recommendations and if the Board considers that a qualified
medical practitioner has been guilty of 'professional misconduct' or
that the complaints have proved him unfit or incapable to practice
the Board may:
(a) erase the name from the medical register
(b) suspend the practitioner for a specified period
(c) erase the name and enter it upon the temporary medical
register subject to terms
43
(d) issue a reprimand
(e) suspend punishment and place the practitioner on probation
on whatever terms the Board may prescribe s. 30 (a)
Section 30(f) of the Act in addition allows the Board to take
disciplinary action for conviction of an indictable offence.
It should be noted that the Medical Act has an expanded
definition of professional misconduct. Section l(i) defines professional misconduct as meaning:
a qualified medical practitioner who has
(A) had his rights or privileges under the Narcotic Control Act
(Canada) or the Food and Drugs Act (Canada) or the regulations
under either Act restricted or withdrawn; or
(B) been guilty, in the opinion of the Board, of misconduct in a
professional respect or of conduct unbecoming a medical
practitioner, or of incompetence; or
(C) engaged in advertising other than to announce the formation
or change of a medical partnership, or...
The definition retains the advantage of leaving open what
activities the Board will not accept4 4 as proper and provides the
42. The members of which need not be members of the Board.
43. s. 30(d) also allows the Discipline Committee to reprimand where the
complaint is not sufficiently serious to appoint an Inquiry Committee or hold a
formal inquiry.
44. Traditionally such nebulous phrases were approved by the Courts and findings
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profession and the public with some basic guide as to the meaning
45
of the term.
In summary, the Medical Act differentiates between complaints
of lack of skill and complaints of misconduct. Although the two
may overlap since incompetence implies a lack of ability or fitness,
the attempt is there to provide a non-punitive effective control over
competence .46
V. Evaluation of Licensure
Licensure as a system has been criticized as a once in a lifetime
deal 47 with the licensing board having little or no jurisdiction after
initial licensure except in extreme cases. 4 8 The Medical Act
amendments in 196949 at least attempted to overcome this criticism
by s. 29. However, a study of the annual reports of the Provincial
Medical Board since 1969 reveals not a single case of proceedings
by way of Section 29.50
It should be noted however that in an interview with Dr.
5 1 it
MacDonald, Registrar of the Provincial Medical Board,
appeared that a Rehabilitation Committee was able to intervene
before the Discipline Committee became involved and procedures
instituted that included retraining programmes, thereby partly
replacing the s.29 procedure in the context of non-punitive
52
corrective measures.
Proposals for remedying this lack of control until problems have
of "infamous conduct in a professional respect" were allowed if the thing done
could be reasonably regarded as disgraceful and dishonourable by his professional
brethren of good repute and competency: Allison v. General Council of Medical
Education and Registration, [ 1894] I Q.B. 750

45. This type of development was recommended by McCnier. Ont. Royal
Commission Report, supra, note 7. Also note that the Provincial Medical Board

publishes outlines of the disciplinary cases in its annual reports, which provide
further guidance. See particularly (1973) Report at 31.
46. Since s. 29 (c) would allow probation on terms, the terms imposed may
include retraining of some kind such as continuing medical education
47. s. 24 of the Medical Act, supra, note 12 only requires an annual licensing fee
to be paid after initial registration.
48. Ludlam, "Medical Staff Privileges: Legal Snares for the Hospital" in
Readings in HospitalLaw of the Amer. Hosp. Assoc., Chicago, Ill.
at 160
49. R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 179 repealed by S.N.S. 1969, c. 15

50. This may be partly due to the overlap indefinition noted earlier between
incompetence and lack of skill.
51. Interview conducted on February 17, 1978.
52. Analogous to the voluntary undertakings in the B.C. Trade Practices Act,
S.B.C. 1974, c. 46
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arisen have gained prominence in many jurisdictions. Some of the
more common proposals are systems of periodic relicensure alone,
or in conjunction with compulsory participation in53continuing
education programmes as a prerequisite to relincensure.
The Nova Scotia Council of Health also recognized the benefits
of continuing medical education (C.M.E.) in its 1972 report and
recommended the acceptance of such a system:
The continued upgrading and renewing of knowledge and
skills by professionals is essential to maintain and improve the
quality of care. We have recommended that regular continuing
to continued
education eventually become a prerequisite
54
professional practice licensing in Nova Scotia.
The Registrar of the P.M.B. writing in the 1969 Report of the
P.M.B., after noting the increasing pace of medical advances and
the development of C.M.E. operated by Dalhousie, commented:
With such a program it should never be necessary in Nova
Scotia for the Government or a Medical Licensing body to make
of relicensure that a physician keep himself
it a condition
55
informed.
and commended the individual physician to keep himself well
informed. 56
Experience, however, shows the opposite. The Nova Scotia
Council of Health reported a participation level of less than 15% of
the potential doctors for the province and that generally it is the
57
same doctors using the programme on a regular basis.
A further criticism of the licensing system with regard to quality
control is that although s. 28(2) of the Medical Act provides a wide
list of who may lodge a complaint with the Board, 58 in fact the
system depends to a large degree on physicians reporting
physicians.
53. R. D. Greene, Assuring Quality in Medical Care (Cambridge,

Mass.:

Ballinger Publishing Co., 1976) at 197
54. N.S. Report of the Nova Scotia Council of Health -

Health Care in Nova

Scotia: A New Directionfor the Seventies (1972) at 110. Note same conclusion in
supra, note 41 at 47
55. N.S. Report of the ProvincialMedical Board of Nova Scotia (Dec. 31, 1969)

at 28
56. Id.
57. Supra, note 54 at 111- 112
58. R. S. McLeary and others, One Life/One Physician: An Inquiry into the
Medical Profession'sPerformance in Self Regulation. A Report to the Centre for
Study of Responsive Law (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1971) at 86
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While professional misconduct may be obvious to the layman it is
entirely conceivable that he would be unaware of deficiencies in the
59
degree of skill or competence of a physician.
The fact that the system is essentially dependent on physicians
reporting their professional colleagues does not in itself make the
licensing system in Nova Scotia useless. It does, however, raise at
least a doubt in this writer's mind that the individual members are
good watchdogs of the public interest. The Merrison Report
recognized the problems of professional loyalty and noted:
Taken too far, such reluctance may represent a considerable
60
inhibition on the effective control of fitness to practice.
Dr. MacDonald, Registrar of the Board, also recognized the
unsurprising possibility that physicians might be a bit slow to report
a fellow colleague but also commented that he felt that they were
less reluctant today than in previous years. 6' In the same context,
the control power of the P.M.B. may have increased in
importance 62 because of the same problems associated with small
hospitals in Nova Scotia, where staff shortages increase reluctance
by physicians to criticize colleagues and make staffing the hospital's
review committees a problem. Dr. MacDonald identified the
process that occurs in such a situation. A physician informs the
hospital administration of a deviation in acceptable standards and he
63
then brings the matter to the attention of the P.M.B. for action.
A further criticism often voiced against the present type of
licensing system is that it is a system based on the control of doctors
by doctors alone. This is also true of the hospital control
mechanisms but a distinction must be made between the two. In the
latter the hospital is not entrusted with looking after the public
interest while in the former it is.
The only assurance in the present system of the primacy of the
public interest is the appointment by the Governor in Council of half
of the Board members6 4 and the Board's recognition of their
responsibility.
The possibility of conflict still exists between professional self
interests and the public interest. J. T. MacLeod re-emphasizes this:
59. Supra, note 41 at 82

60. Id.
61. Supra, note 51
62. The 1969 amendments to the Medical Act and the stress on non-punitive

measures has probably helped account for this.
63. Supra, note 51
64. Supra, note 12 at s. 2
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Professions often tend to assume that, because the object of
professional regulation is to maintain quality and to protect the
public, the interest of the profession must necessarily be identical
with the best interests of society. This sweeping assumption is by
no means valid. Indeed it will be argued below that in some
respects the interests of a profession
and public interest may be
65
sharply divergent and in conflict.
Perhaps the most striking example of this is the pressing need for
drastic change from the health care system described by the Nova
Scotia Council of Health, "In short, a flawed and awkward system
is demanding more money than we can afford and providing too
66
little in return.''
The Council felt the key to reform to be

"...

acceptance of

sweeping changes, both by the public and by the people working
within the system." 6 7 The drastic changes may well involve a
redefinition of concern from the medical to total health care and thus
the medical profession may well feel threatened and resist change.
To correct this, consumer participation has been suggested as a
solution by many inquiries and commissions6 8 not only for this
purpose of easing change 69 but also to ensure professional bodies
such as the P.M.B. remain aware of their responsibility to the public
70
and act as a safeguard against injury to the public interest.
VI. Consumer Participation
Where consumer participation has been incorporated into the
system, the effects of having lay participation have not yet been
assessed. Reforms in Ontario with the Health Discipline Act 7 ' and
in Quebec with the Medical Act 72 and the Professional Code73
create systems involving substantial lay participation. Both
recognize the fundamental principle behind professional
65. Sask., Dept. of Pub. Health. Report on Consumer Participation,Regulation of
the Professions, Decentralization of Health Services (1973) - prepared by J.T.

MacLeod.
6. Supra, note 54 at i

67. Id. at ii
68. e.g. Economic Council of Canada. Interim Report on Competition Policy
(Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1969) at 151; Merrison Report, supra, note 41; N.S.
Report of the Committee on Health ProfessionalLicensing in Nova Scotia (1976)

69. Supra, note 6 at 29
70. Ont. Royal Commission Report, supra, note 7 at 1166

71. S.0. 1974, c.47 as am. by S.O. 1975, c.63
72. S.Q. 1973, c. 46
73. S.Q. 1973, c. 43 as am. by S.Q. 1974, c. 65
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self-government; 74 that only a professional peer or equal who
partakes of the same body of knowledge can judge adequately the
skill or competence of another practitioner. 75 What benefits then are
really reaped by having consumer participation?
76
There are basically two benefits:
1) the benefits that may be gained by having consumers become
more aware and involved in the health problems 77 (and
conversely, the profession become more aware of the consumer's
views and problems in medical care); and
2) the esoteric satisfaction of removing the anamoly of a non
democratic
institution wielding enormous power in a democratic
78
society.
This writer has no intention to belittle these benefits of consumer
participation and the attempts to make the system more consumeroriented (i.e., assert the public interest without, it should be noted,
another cumbersome government bureaucracy of department) and at
the same time maintain a high degree of professional autonomy and
pride. 79 However, the main benefits of acts such as those passed in
Ontario and Quebec are sometimes lost in the discussion of lay
participation.
The Health Disciplines Act, for example, establishes a review by
the Minister of the activities of the Council 80 and allows for an
active input, thereby protecting the public interest to a significant
extent since the Minister can be questioned in the Legislative
Assembly.81

The Council is given extended powers to make regulations,
subject to the approval of the Lieutenant-Govemor in Council to
inter alia:
• . providing for a program of continuing education of members
74. Peer review is maintained in both systems with only minor lay participation in
disciplinary matters. See supra, note 71 at s. 57 and s. 58 and Id. at s. 114

75. Supra, note 65 at 61
76. There are many more benefits included in the 2 basic ones given, such as
control of the medical profession's immense influence in areas of physician
assistantship or simply allowing justice to be seen to be done.
77. Supra, note 6 at 29
78. Id.
79. Report of the Committee on Healing Arts, vol. 3, c. 25 at 29 noted the

importance of professional pride and the folly it would be to minimize the benefits
of professional pride.
80. The Council is created by s. 48 and is similar in function to the P.M.B. but
with non health profession representation.
81.

S.0. 1974, c. 47, ss. 49, 50
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to maintain their standard of competence and
requiring members
82
to participate in such continuing education.
Thus setting up machinery that can effectively upgrade the quality
of care that consumers can reasonably expect to receive.
This type of development may very well have lasting significance
whereas the role of lay participation may go the same route of
hospital Boards of Trustees, which although legally responsible for
standards in the hospital, have abdicated this responsibility to the
83
physicians in the hospital.
This is not to minimize the case for consumer participation which
has many advantages and at least no readily apparent disadvantages.
VII. Conclusions
It is safe to say that generally the quality of medical care in Nova
Scotia is quite high and is due primarily to the efforts of the medical
profession itself. There is, however, room for improvement in the
manner of regulation. Consumer participation of at least some level
seems inevitable. 84 Furthermore, the P.M.B. should take a more
active role in effectively promoting excellence in its efforts to
establish a minimum level of competence through such measures as
enforced continuing medical education.
The Board has made progress through attempts to remove the
punitive aspects of quality control recognized to be inimical to
85
encouraging the self-policing role of the physician.
There are limits to every system, and the licensure system cannot
possibly ensure that all physicians will at any given time be
providing an adequate quality of medical care. To fill this gap the
other control mechanisms step in. The hospital can provide the type
of active day to day supervision impossible with a licensing
authority. 86

The malpractice action also has a role to play in a traditional
sense of providing compensation to victims of medical negligence
and also as a form of social control over the standards of the
82. Id. s. 50 (n)
83. Grove, supra, note 7 at 177
84. e.g. Report of the Committee on Health Professional Licensing, supra, note
68, recommended lay participation in an overseer capacity rather than in the
licensing body.
85. Supra, note 83 and, supra, note41 at 81
86. It should also be noted that hospital regulation may be important because of the
greater risk of activities carried on in a hospital such as major surgery.
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profession. Although the extent of these roles can be affected by the
efficacy of the other controls, it must be realized that no licensing
authority or hospital supervision can eradicate the existence of
87
malpractice.
In summary, the delegation made to the medical profession has
warranted our trust only in the last decade when the Provincial
Medical Board has actively undertaken its responsibility to ensure
the competence of physicians entered in the medical register. The
trend in the future points to the hospital undertaking increased
responsibilities in protecting the consumer, perhaps in conjunction
with the Health Services and Insurance Commission.
If fulfilled, these institutional controls can hopefully provide a
better system of protection to the consumer than the highly touted
competitive market has provided with respect to other services.
87. Canadian Medical Protection Association. Seventy Sixth Annual Report (June
1977) at 16.

